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the judicial review decision?
by Francesca Lagerberg ACA, Barrister
The author considers the fall-out from the case of R v Professional Contractors Group Ltd {^Others.
O n Monday 2 April the judgment was handed down in the judicial review case concerning the legality of the rules affecting the provision of personal service 
companies ('IR35'). The judge held that the case brought by 
the Professional Contractors Group (PCG) did not succeed 
and IR3 5 did not breach human rights or European law.
IR35 has been by far the most contentious addition to 
the UK tax system in recent years. Introduced primarily to 
target a perceived unfair avoidance of National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs) by the payment of dividends rather 
than salary, it sets up a new regime for those who provide 
personal services via an intermediary. For those affected, it 
requires the consideration of a hypothetical contract 
between the worker who provides personal services 
through an intermediary, such as a company or partnership, 
and the client with whom the intermediary has contracted. 
The issue is whether the worker is effectively an employee 
or self-employed in relation to the client. This involves the 
consideration of the Schedule D/Schedule E status cases 
that we have grown to know if not love.
Those who are determined to be 'employees' under this 
hypothetical contract must perform a deemed payment 
calculation, usually at the tax year end, and pay any tax and 
NICs due by the normal PAYE payment dates. This article 
considers what (if any) guidance we can draw from the 
judicial review decision.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
The PCG and others contended in the case that the IR35 
rules should be challenged on die basis that they were 
incompatible with European Community Law and the 
Human Rights Act 1998.
Human Rights
The human rights angle in the case always appeared to 
be a fallback argument. On the issue of whether IR35 
breaches the Human Rights Act 1998, the High Court 
Judge, Mr Justice Burton, noted that:
'The legislation does not create a new category of law. It 
submits the service contractors to the same law as they would have 
been subject to, butjbr the interposition and/or operation of the 
service company'.
This is referring to the Schedule D/Schedule E test for
o
determining if someone is self-employed or an employee. 
He did go on to criticise various aspects of the Revenue's 
guidance on employment status, such as the statement in 
the Revenue's Employment Status Manual that 'mutuality 
of obligation' is not a relevant issue in such cases. 
Mutuality of obligation means that if someone is offered 
work and feels obliged to take it, and the person offering 
it feels obliged to offer it to that person, there is evidence 
of a link between the two that might be indicative of an 
employment rather than self-employment arrangement. 
The issue of Revenue guidance is returned to below.
However, despite misgivings about some of the 
Revenue's guidance material on status issues the judge did 
not think this led to 'unacceptable uncertainty' and nor 
was IR35 incompatible with fundamental rights. Therefore 
it did not breach the Human Rights Act.
European Law
The European aspect was amended during the case to 
specifically seek a declaration that IR35 was an unnotified 
State aid contrary to Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty. 
Did IR35 effectively amount to unlawful state aid because 
it helped those larger companies unaffected by IR3S who 
are, at least in certain sectors, competitors of the service 
companies? After careful consideration of the law on state 
aid, he concluded that:
'No one can be identified as a recipient ojthat aid, certainly 
no one sufficiently specifically identified or identifiable: and 
looking at it, ... on a broad pragmatic basis in the light of the 
policy underlying Article 8 7, this was not state aid, and 
consequently did not require to be notified'.
The second European law aspect was whether IR35 was 
an unlawful hindrance to free movement of workers, 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, 
contrary to Articles 39, 43 and 49 respectively of the 
Treaty. No again, said the judge. He made a careful analysis 
of the facts but found nothing that warranted a finding of 
a breach in these areas.
The PCG had argued that IR35 would make workers, 
especially in the field of information technology, be put off 
from coming to this country to work and, even worse, driven
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to leave the UK because of the harsher regime. However, 
despite accepting that the rules in the UK affecting such 
workers were now more restrictive, the judge was not 
convinced that this was disproportionate in relation to the 
tax avoidance that the rules were brought in to combat.
The judge did make eight findings of fact in this case:
(1) The intent of IR3 5 is to eliminate the avoidance of tax 
and NIC on payments made by clients in respect of 
services provided by those who are in fact equivalent to 
employees; and it has that effect on the companies to 
which it applies.
(2) Many service contractors will be required to pay more 
monies and earlier to the Inland Revenue under IR35 
than under the previous arrangements.
(3) At least two-thirds of service contractors are caught 
by the arguments advanced under the European law 
elements of the case.
(4) Instead of certainty as to the impact of tax and NIC, 
service contractors as a result of IR35 have uncertainty 
as to whether IR3S will or will not apply to a particular 
engagement.
(5) In respect of engagements or contracts sought, or 
services to be provided, by service contractors, there is 
or would be competition with companies who would 
be unaffected by IR35.
(6) Companies unaffected by IR3S will have greater 
flexibility to arrange their tax affairs, to allocate tax 
between income tax and corporation tax, to defer tax 
liabilities, and to pay lesser salaries to those providing 
the services and higher dividends to shareholders, than 
service contractors.
(7) Some service contractors may not continue to operate 
in the UK as a result of IR35, and some who have 
intended to come to the UK to set up or work as 
service contractors may not now come to the UK.
(8) Factors 5, 6 and/or 7 above may have an effect on 
trade between Member States.
WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
The end result in this case was rather bluntly summarised 
by the victorious Inland Revenue in a press release on 2 
April 2001. It noted:
'The IR35 legislation is the law of the land, as enacted by 
Parliament and upheld by the Court. Individuals affected by it 
will need to make sure they take the necessary actions to ensure 
they comply with their obligations under this law'.
WHAT DOES THE CASE REALLY MEAN?
The key point arising out of the case appears to be that 
little has changed. Those that were clearly within IR35 
before the case will be so now. Those that were outside will 
remain outside.
What is likely to result from the case is that the Revenue 
may revisit some of its guidance. It has stated that it will 'look 
at the judge's remarks to see if there are any amendments 
that need to be made to clarify any of the wording'. This may 
result in more clarity for those who are in the borderline 
situation of being unsure of whether they are within or 
outside of IR35. It is also important for those assessing the 
Revenue's guidance material to be aware that this guidance is 
only the Revenue's interpretation and should be viewed in 
that light. If you think the situation warrants it, its view can 
be challenged and various aspects of the judicial review case 
highlight where the weak spots may be.
HOW WILL PEOPLE KNOW IF THEY 
CAUGHT BY IR35?
Whilst some fall squarely outside the rules, others are 
clearly within them. But of course there are large areas of 
'grey' where the issue may not be clear.
Firstly, vou need to determine if someone is workingj ' J O
through an intermediary, which is caught by IR35. The 
rules here can be found in the Finance Act 2000, Sched. 12. 
If the intermediary is caught, then it is necessary to 
imagine that if the intermediary was taken out of the 
picture and a notional or hypothetical contract placed 
between the worker and the client, would that contract be 
one of employment or self-employment?
As the test is whether or not the worker is effectively 
employed, you need to apply the traditional Schedule 
D/Schedule E tests. There is a considerable body of case 
law in this area (see Hall v Lorimer [1994] STC 23, for 
instance) and the issue all comes down to the facts. The 
over-all picture is the key factor and whatever the contract 
says the reality of the situation takes precedence.
Important factors will include:
  Is the worker at financial risk in the project? Can he 
make losses as well as profits?
  Can he make more money if he does the job well?
  Can he hire his own workers or provide substitutes for 
the job instead of himself?
  Can he control his work? This can encompass where he 
works, when he works, what he does and how he does it.
  The intention of the parties.
  The length of the contract.
  The pay structure, e.g. holiday pay.
  The number of engagements the worker has.
However, it is important to look at the 'big picture' and 
not take a 'check-list' approach.
WHAT DOES THE JUDICIAL REVIEW CASE 
ADD TO THE STATUS DECISION?
Some very useful points in relation to employment 
status were mentioned in the IR35 judicial review case. 
These were in particular:
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(1) Mr Justice Burton noted that there is a 'heavy 
responsibility' upon the tax inspector in respect of the 
position of any individual taxpayer. He confirmed that: 
'It is essential that there is a sensitive and co-operative 
approach taken by such Inspectors and that the 
Revenue guidance is clear and helpful'.
(2) He then went on to criticise various aspects of the 
guidance offered by the Revenue in its Employment 
Status Manual (ESM). As mentioned, above he 
criticised the Revenue's unwillingness to accept the 
importance of 'mutuality of obligation' in determining 
someone's employment status.
The judge also criticised the Revenue's attitude in the 
Manual to 'substitution clauses'. This is the right of a
o
worker to send someone along, of equal competence as 
himself or herself, to perform services and has been found 
by the courts to be a strong indicator of self-employment 
(e.g. Express and Echo Publication v Tanton [1999] ICR 693). 
The importance of the right of substitution is very watered 
down in the ESM. The judge noted, in particular:
'It would not be right to make an absolute statement, as the 
Revenue appears to do in another of its guidance documents, that 
the need to obtain a client's permission necessarily negates the 
existence of a right of substitution and/or points to employment'.
The judge also states quite explicitly that it is:
'.. .essential to any consideration of the common law test as to 
whether an individual is trading as an employee or as an 
independent contractor, that consideration should be given to 
whether he is in business on his own account'.
This comment highlights that it is important to consider 
this issue before looking at any surrounding contracts.
There has been considerable discussion as to the relevance 
of various contracts surrounding a possible IR35 
arrangement. For example, is a contract between agencies 
that an intermediary works with, relevant to the employment 
status of a particular worker? The judge notes the following:
'It appears to me clear that the Revenue must bear in mind 
that under IR35 they are not considering an actual contract between 
the service company and the client, but imagining or constructing a 
notional contract which does not in fact exist. In those circumstances, 
of course the terms of a contract between the agency and the client as 
a result of which the service contractor will be present at the site are 
important, as would be the terms of any contract between the service 
company and the agency: But particularly given thejact that, at any 
rate at present, a contract on standard terms may or may not be 
imposed by an agency, or may be applicable not by reference to a 
particular assignment, but on an on-going basis, and may actually 
bear no relationship to the (non-contractual) interface between the 
client and the service contractor, such documents can onlyjorm a 
part, albeit obviously an important part, of the picture'.
The Revenue will give an opinion on whether an existing 
contract (not a future contract) falls in or outside of the 
rules.
WHAT IS I MADE THE WRONG STATUS 
CASE DECISION?
Clearly the issue of someone's work status can be 
complex. It is important to consider all available guidance 
and to set out the complete situation to those you are 
advising explaining the implications of any decision.
There are two relevant points in the judicial review case 
on this issue:
(1) In an Inland Revenue penalty statement issued on 13 
March 2001, it states that although penalties may be 
sought for an incorrect return (under the normal PAYE 
rules) an
'.. .employer might Jail to meet its obligations to file a correct 
return because of a genuine misunderstanding about the rules 
caused by their newness. This would be taken into account, along 
with the effort made by the employer to establish whether a 
contract is subject to the new rules, when considering penalties' .
(2) There is also reference to the Revenue's leaflet IR109 
that expressly states: 'if you have taken all reasonable 
care, we do not seek penalties'.
Of course, the latter point begs the question of what is 
'reasonable'. Tax advisers would be wise to make a clear file 
note of what factors they took into account in reaching 
their decisions on status issues.
DOES IR35 GIVE EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS TO 
AFFECTED WORKERS?
It was impishly suggested by the Judge during the judicial 
review case that if a worker was within IR35 they might 
contend that they were entitled to some of the benefits as 
well as the downsides of employment.
Mr Justice Burton dealt with this point in his judgment 
by saying that there is no binding conclusion that because 
someone is treated as an employee for tax purposes that 
they are an employee for any other purpose   although that 
would not preclude someone from arguing the point in 
relevant circumstances.
Being within IR35 does not grant entitlement as against 
a client as to the benefits of employment but insofar as 
NICs are paid on higher notional remuneration he will 
receive the benefit of those higher payments in respect of 
state benefits, which depend upon a person's NIC 
contribution history.
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE DECISION IS 
APPEALED?
The PCG, who brought the judicial review case, are still 
deciding if they will appeal. If they do, and are able to take 
an appeal, it is likely to involve a referral to the European 
Court of Justice on a question of law. ®
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